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RENÉGOCIER POUR DURER : UNE ANALYSE EMPIRIQUE DES CONTRATS DE CONCESSIONS/RENEGOTIATE TO LAST: AN EMPIRICAL CONCESSIONS CONTRACTS ANALYSIS
This paper examines the impact of renegotiations on contractual relationship. Using an original data set of expired public-private contracts in the French car park sector, we investigate the link between renegotiations and contract renewals. Indeed, if renegotiations led to surplus decrease, then pa...
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Published in: | Revue d'économie industrielle 2013-01 (141), p.117 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | fre |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper examines the impact of renegotiations on contractual relationship. Using an original data set of expired public-private contracts in the French car park sector, we investigate the link between renegotiations and contract renewals. Indeed, if renegotiations led to surplus decrease, then parties would not be prone to contract again together. Our econometric results reveal that some renegotiation types, their frequency, and their scope clearly impact the probability to see a contract renewed as soon as public authorities have discretionary power on the decision to renew a contract with the same private partner. Hence, our results suggest a positive, negative, or neutral impact on the contractual surplus depending on the kind of renegotiation and the kind of contract that is considered. |
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ISSN: | 0154-3229 1773-0198 |