Sharing the Rewards, Dividing the Costs? The Electoral Consequences of Social Pacts and Legislative Reform in Western Europe

Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:West European politics 2015-01, Vol.38 (1), p.206-227
Main Authors: Hamann, Kerstin, Johnston, Alison, Katsanidou, Alexia, Kelly, John, Pollock, Philip H.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Benefits
Coalitions
Cost
Elections
Electoral College
Employers
Government
Governmental reform
Labor market
Legislation
Lobbying
Majorities
Markets
Minorities
Minority Governments
Probability
Unions
Voting
Wages
Welfare
Welfare economics
Western Europe
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Summary:Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments' pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents' vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least.
ISSN:0140-2382
1743-9655
DOI:10.1080/01402382.2014.911481