How not to test for philosophical expertise

Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the 'expertise defense' of philosophical intuition. I argue...

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Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2015-02, Vol.192 (2), p.431-452
Main Author: Rini, Regina A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Logic
Metaphysics
Morality
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
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description Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the 'expertise defense' of philosophical intuition. I argue that the use of familiar cases and principles constitutes a methodological problem. Since these items are familiar to philosophers, but not ordinary people, the two subject groups do not confront identical cognitive tasks. Reflection on this point shows that these findings do not threaten philosophical expertise—though we can draw lessons for more effective empirical tests.
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subjects Education
Epistemology
Logic
Metaphysics
Morality
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
title How not to test for philosophical expertise
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