Feedback from moral philosophy to cognitive science

A popular argument form uses general theories of cognitive architecture to motivate conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. This paper highlights the possibility for modus tollens reversal of this argument form. If theories of cognitive architecture generate predictions for moral cognition,...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical psychology 2015-05, Vol.28 (4), p.569-588
Main Author: Rini, Regina A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognition & reasoning
Cognitive Science
Ethics
Feedback
Moral Cognition
Moral Philosophy
Morality
Philosophers
Philosophy
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Summary:A popular argument form uses general theories of cognitive architecture to motivate conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. This paper highlights the possibility for modus tollens reversal of this argument form. If theories of cognitive architecture generate predictions for moral cognition, then tests of moral thinking provide feedback to cognitive science. In certain circumstances, philosophers' introspective attention to their own moral deliberations can provide unique data for these tests. Recognizing the possibility for this sort of feedback helps to illuminate a deep continuity between the disciplines.
ISSN:0951-5089
1465-394X
DOI:10.1080/09515089.2013.864454