The Feeling of Thinking: Sense of Agency in Delusions of Thought Insertion

The predictive coding model of motor control explains delusions of alien control in terms of loss of a "sense of agency" for intentional action. In this paper I argue that the same model can explain delusions of thought insertion in terms of loss of a sense of agency for inner speech. The...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Psychology of consciousness (Washington, D.C.) D.C.), 2015-09, Vol.2 (3), p.291-300
Main Author: Gerrans, Philip
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency
Cognitions
Delusions
Human
Motor Processes
Schizophrenia
Self-Talk
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Summary:The predictive coding model of motor control explains delusions of alien control in terms of loss of a "sense of agency" for intentional action. In this paper I argue that the same model can explain delusions of thought insertion in terms of loss of a sense of agency for inner speech. The essential idea is that inner speech is a form of imaginary action. I explain how imaginary actions in general, and imaginary speech in particular, acquire and lose a sense of agency, and apply the model to the neuroscientific evidence from schizophrenia. I consider problems for the account deriving from the indirect connection between thought and language.
ISSN:2326-5523
2326-5531
DOI:10.1037/cns0000060