Loading…
CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China
This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly app...
Saved in:
Published in: | Emerging markets review 2015-09, Vol.24, p.149-159 |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c515t-9d9100c68c389e4ce0285c5e11ed324ba4807b137bf5ee993f51df1f6e8c5f63 |
---|---|
cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c515t-9d9100c68c389e4ce0285c5e11ed324ba4807b137bf5ee993f51df1f6e8c5f63 |
container_end_page | 159 |
container_issue | |
container_start_page | 149 |
container_title | Emerging markets review |
container_volume | 24 |
creator | Xie, Jun |
description | This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly appointed CEOs are prone to invest less and more efficiently. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, depending on their ultimate ownership. The age effect seems stronger in state-owned enterprises and the new appointment effect seems stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that CEOs have long-term career concerns that can improve a firm's investment efficiency even in a transitional economy such as China. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.ememar.2015.06.001 |
format | article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1717448360</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S1566014115000412</els_id><sourcerecordid>3821907651</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c515t-9d9100c68c389e4ce0285c5e11ed324ba4807b137bf5ee993f51df1f6e8c5f63</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kEtPwzAQhC0EEqXwDzhY4pzgrR9JOCBBVB5SpV56t1JnLRwRp9hppf573IYzp53DzOzuR8g9sBwYqMcuxx77JuQLBjJnKmcMLsgMyoJnCgp-mbRUKmMg4JrcxNglgxIMZuS1Xq6paQJioGbwBoOPtPEtdf6AcezRjxStdcahN8cnujy4NimkNgw9rb-cb27JlW2-I979zTnZvC039Ue2Wr9_1i-rzEiQY1a1FTBmVGl4WaEwyBalNBIBsOULsW1EyYot8GJrJWJVcSuhtWAVlkZaxefkYardheFnn27T3bAPPm3UUEAhRMkVSy4xuUwYYgxo9S64hOaogekTLN3pCZY-wdJM6cQixZ6nGKYHDg6DjuePsXUBzajbwf1f8AswgnNz</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1717448360</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China</title><source>ScienceDirect Journals</source><creator>Xie, Jun</creator><creatorcontrib>Xie, Jun</creatorcontrib><description>This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly appointed CEOs are prone to invest less and more efficiently. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, depending on their ultimate ownership. The age effect seems stronger in state-owned enterprises and the new appointment effect seems stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that CEOs have long-term career concerns that can improve a firm's investment efficiency even in a transitional economy such as China.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1566-0141</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-6173</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2015.06.001</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Age ; Career concerns ; CEO age ; Chief executive officers ; China ; Efficiency ; Emerging markets ; Investment efficiency ; Investment policy ; New CEO appointment ; Studies</subject><ispartof>Emerging markets review, 2015-09, Vol.24, p.149-159</ispartof><rights>2015 Elsevier B.V.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c515t-9d9100c68c389e4ce0285c5e11ed324ba4807b137bf5ee993f51df1f6e8c5f63</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c515t-9d9100c68c389e4ce0285c5e11ed324ba4807b137bf5ee993f51df1f6e8c5f63</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Xie, Jun</creatorcontrib><title>CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China</title><title>Emerging markets review</title><description>This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly appointed CEOs are prone to invest less and more efficiently. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, depending on their ultimate ownership. The age effect seems stronger in state-owned enterprises and the new appointment effect seems stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that CEOs have long-term career concerns that can improve a firm's investment efficiency even in a transitional economy such as China.</description><subject>Age</subject><subject>Career concerns</subject><subject>CEO age</subject><subject>Chief executive officers</subject><subject>China</subject><subject>Efficiency</subject><subject>Emerging markets</subject><subject>Investment efficiency</subject><subject>Investment policy</subject><subject>New CEO appointment</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>1566-0141</issn><issn>1873-6173</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2015</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kEtPwzAQhC0EEqXwDzhY4pzgrR9JOCBBVB5SpV56t1JnLRwRp9hppf573IYzp53DzOzuR8g9sBwYqMcuxx77JuQLBjJnKmcMLsgMyoJnCgp-mbRUKmMg4JrcxNglgxIMZuS1Xq6paQJioGbwBoOPtPEtdf6AcezRjxStdcahN8cnujy4NimkNgw9rb-cb27JlW2-I979zTnZvC039Ue2Wr9_1i-rzEiQY1a1FTBmVGl4WaEwyBalNBIBsOULsW1EyYot8GJrJWJVcSuhtWAVlkZaxefkYardheFnn27T3bAPPm3UUEAhRMkVSy4xuUwYYgxo9S64hOaogekTLN3pCZY-wdJM6cQixZ6nGKYHDg6DjuePsXUBzajbwf1f8AswgnNz</recordid><startdate>20150901</startdate><enddate>20150901</enddate><creator>Xie, Jun</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier BV</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20150901</creationdate><title>CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China</title><author>Xie, Jun</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c515t-9d9100c68c389e4ce0285c5e11ed324ba4807b137bf5ee993f51df1f6e8c5f63</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2015</creationdate><topic>Age</topic><topic>Career concerns</topic><topic>CEO age</topic><topic>Chief executive officers</topic><topic>China</topic><topic>Efficiency</topic><topic>Emerging markets</topic><topic>Investment efficiency</topic><topic>Investment policy</topic><topic>New CEO appointment</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Xie, Jun</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Emerging markets review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Xie, Jun</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China</atitle><jtitle>Emerging markets review</jtitle><date>2015-09-01</date><risdate>2015</risdate><volume>24</volume><spage>149</spage><epage>159</epage><pages>149-159</pages><issn>1566-0141</issn><eissn>1873-6173</eissn><abstract>This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly appointed CEOs are prone to invest less and more efficiently. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, depending on their ultimate ownership. The age effect seems stronger in state-owned enterprises and the new appointment effect seems stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that CEOs have long-term career concerns that can improve a firm's investment efficiency even in a transitional economy such as China.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.ememar.2015.06.001</doi><tpages>11</tpages></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 1566-0141 |
ispartof | Emerging markets review, 2015-09, Vol.24, p.149-159 |
issn | 1566-0141 1873-6173 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1717448360 |
source | ScienceDirect Journals |
subjects | Age Career concerns CEO age Chief executive officers China Efficiency Emerging markets Investment efficiency Investment policy New CEO appointment Studies |
title | CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China |
url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-30T22%3A44%3A34IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=CEO%20career%20concerns%20and%20investment%20efficiency:%20Evidence%20from%20China&rft.jtitle=Emerging%20markets%20review&rft.au=Xie,%20Jun&rft.date=2015-09-01&rft.volume=24&rft.spage=149&rft.epage=159&rft.pages=149-159&rft.issn=1566-0141&rft.eissn=1873-6173&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.ememar.2015.06.001&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E3821907651%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c515t-9d9100c68c389e4ce0285c5e11ed324ba4807b137bf5ee993f51df1f6e8c5f63%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1717448360&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |