Heterogeneous Effects of Informational Nudges on Pro-social Behavior

Numerous experimental studies of informational nudges both in the lab and the field have demonstrated not just that informational nudges are effective policy tools for influencing behavior, but also that nudges have heterogeneous impacts that differ depending on the characteristics of the person inv...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:B.E. journal of economic analysis and policy (Online) 2015-10, Vol.15 (4), p.1619-1655
Main Authors: Bao, Jiayi, Ho, Benjamin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Altruism
Behavior modification
Behavioral decision theory
Economic models
heterogeneity
impure altruism
Information management
Knowledge management
moral cleansing
moral licensing
Morality
nudge
Social psychology
Studies
warm glow
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Summary:Numerous experimental studies of informational nudges both in the lab and the field have demonstrated not just that informational nudges are effective policy tools for influencing behavior, but also that nudges have heterogeneous impacts that differ depending on the characteristics of the person involved and the situation. We adapt Andreoni’s theory of warm-glow impure altruism to account for how altruism motives respond differently depending on the disposition of the person and the situation. The model explains both positive spillovers (moral cleansing) and negative spillovers (moral licensing) for behavioral interventions, showing that targeting of informational campaigns depends on the complementarity between people’s traits and the intervention’s content. More importantly, the design of economic incentives (like Pigouvian taxes) to shift economic behavior should depend on both the distribution of social preferences in the population and the use of behavioral interventions.
ISSN:2194-6108
1935-1682
DOI:10.1515/bejeap-2014-0125