The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case

•Public complaint enforcement may reduce deterrence by increasing errors.•Probabilities of Type I and Type II errors increase with the number of complaints.•Complaint enforcement explains the weaknesses of Russian antitrust policy. In responding to complaints, law enforcement by a supervisory author...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International review of law and economics 2015-08, Vol.43, p.200-208
Main Authors: Avdasheva, Svetlana, Kryuchkova, Polina
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Acquittals & mistrials
Antitrust
Authority
Complaints
False arrests & convictions
Law enforcement
Legal errors
Public enforcement
Russia
Studies
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Summary:•Public complaint enforcement may reduce deterrence by increasing errors.•Probabilities of Type I and Type II errors increase with the number of complaints.•Complaint enforcement explains the weaknesses of Russian antitrust policy. In responding to complaints, law enforcement by a supervisory authority may replicate the advantages and disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement, there are strong incentives to open investigations with respect to almost every complaint. However, increased numbers of complaints and investigations mean fewer available resources per investigation and lower standards of proof. These increased numbers also distort the enforcement structure, increase the probability of wrongful convictions and acquittals, and decrease deterrence.
ISSN:0144-8188
1873-6394
DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2014.04.003