Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory

Working Paper No. 21943 We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of o...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:NBER Working Paper Series 2016-01, p.21943
Main Authors: Bouton, Laurent, Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, Malherbe, Frédéric
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aggregates
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Councils
Decision making
Economic theory
Economics
Hypotheses
International organizations
Laboratories
Majority rule
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Working Paper No. 21943 We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.
ISSN:0898-2937
DOI:10.3386/w21943