Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law

We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative-executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of political science 2016-04, Vol.60 (2), p.401-417
Main Authors: Farhang, Sean, Yaver, Miranda
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Administrative agencies
Administrative law
Bureaucracy
Coalitions
Conflict
Delegation of authority
Divided government
Economic regulation
Federal legislation
Fuels
Government bureaucracy
Government regulation
Law
Legislatures
Policy implementation
Policy making
Political behavior
Political parties
Power
Regulatory legislation
Statutory law
Voting
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Summary:We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative-executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the period 1947–2008, and test hypotheses linking separation-of-powers structures to legislative design of fragmented implementation power. We find that divided party government is powerfully associated with fragmentation in policy implementation, and that this association contributed to the long-run growth of fragmentation in the postwar United States. We further find that legislative coalitions are more likely to fragment implementation power in the face of greater uncertainty about remaining in the majority.
ISSN:0092-5853
1540-5907
DOI:10.1111/ajps.12188