NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL

We explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory. Under this view, differences in behavior across subjects is driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms. We introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual no...

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Published in:Journal of the European Economic Association 2016-06, Vol.14 (3), p.608-638
Main Authors: Kimbrough, Erik O., Vostroknutov, Alexander
Format: Article
Language:English
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C91
C92
D03
Economic models
Game theory
Norms
Social norms
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description We explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory. Under this view, differences in behavior across subjects is driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms. We introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual normsensitivity, and we show how it relates to play in public goods, trust, dictator, and ultimatum games.We show how our observations can be rationalized in a stylized model of norm-dependent preferences under reasonable assumptions about the nature of social norms. Then we directly elicit norms in these games to test the robustness of our interpretation.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/jeea.12152
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate; EBSCOhost Econlit with Full Text; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Oxford Journals Online
subjects C91
C92
D03
Economic models
Game theory
Norms
Social norms
title NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL
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