Social dilemmas in the laboratory and in the field

• Published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization 2016-08, Vol.128, p.85-96
• Main Authors: Englmaier, Florian, Gebhardt, Georg
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Behavioral sciences; Collective action; External validity; Field and laboratory experiments; Field study; Laboratories; Productivity; Public good; Public goods; Social dilemmas; Team production
• ISSN: 0167-2681; 1879-1751
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.03.006

•We combine a laboratory public good experiment with a field experiment.•The three field treatments differ only with respect to the presence of a social dilemma structure.•In the social dilemma treatment, subjects who contribute little in the laboratory provide less effort.•Selecting subjects according to laboratory contribution increases productivity as much as selecting on ability.•The correlation between laboratory and field disappears in two control treatments. We observe each subject in laboratory public good experiments and in one of three treatments of a field experiment. These treatments differ with respect to the presence or absence of a social dilemma. With the social dilemma present in the field, subjects who contribute less in the laboratory provide less effort. Selecting individuals according to laboratory contribution increases productivity as much as selecting on ability. This correlation disappears in the two treatments without a social dilemma. We conclude that we can use laboratory experiments to learn about behaviour in situations that share the game form but not necessarily the frame.