Farewell to Certitude: Einstein's Novelty on Induction and Deduction, Fallibilism

In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowled...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal for general philosophy of science 2000-01, Vol.31 (1), p.19-37
Main Author: Adam, Avshalom M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
19th century
Axioms
Certitude
Epistemology
Geometry
History
History of science and technology
Mathematical induction
Opportunistic behavior
Physical sciences and techniques
Physical theory
Physics
Relativity
Scientific method
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Summary:In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919-1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not consider Duhem's Instrumentalism, he argued against Poincaré's Conventionalism. Hitherto, Einstein's Fallibilism, as presented at first in a rarely known essay of 1919, was left in the dark. Recently, Howard obscured its meaning. Einstein's essay was never translated into English. In my paper I provide its translation and attempt to shed light on Einstein's view and its context; I also direct attention to Einstein's images of philosophical opportunism in scientific practice.
ISSN:0925-4560
1572-8587
DOI:10.1023/A:1008380527490