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‘Can’t buy me legitimacy’: the elusive stability of Mideast rentier regimes
This paper qualitatively revisits the thesis that rentier regimes can draw on their non-tax revenues to buy political legitimacy and stability. Exploring the material/moral interplay in Mideast rentier politics, I show why and how rents may provide for provisional, but not sustainable, stability for...
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Published in: | Journal of international relations and development 2017, Vol.20 (1), p.55-79 |
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description | This paper qualitatively revisits the thesis that rentier regimes can draw on their non-tax revenues to buy political legitimacy and stability. Exploring the material/moral interplay in Mideast rentier politics, I show why and how rents may provide for provisional, but not sustainable, stability for authoritarian rentier regimes. I propose distinguishing between negative and positive political legitimacy, the former being about ‘what is legitimate’ (liberty
vs
security), and the latter about ‘who is the legitimator’ (divine/hereditary right
vs
popular sovereignty). Sustainable stability is predicated on having both legitimacies. Rentier regimes, however, often draw exclusively on negative political legitimacy. These regimes can use rents to buy time — through coercion and expediency — contriving an imagery of a lusty Leviathan. But due to the diversity of rents and the temporal shifts in their revenues, this social contract is materially contingent and morally frail — rendering authoritarian rentier regimes, not least in the Middle East, more mortal than they, and many observers, are ready to admit. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1057/jird.2014.32 |
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vs
security), and the latter about ‘who is the legitimator’ (divine/hereditary right
vs
popular sovereignty). Sustainable stability is predicated on having both legitimacies. Rentier regimes, however, often draw exclusively on negative political legitimacy. These regimes can use rents to buy time — through coercion and expediency — contriving an imagery of a lusty Leviathan. But due to the diversity of rents and the temporal shifts in their revenues, this social contract is materially contingent and morally frail — rendering authoritarian rentier regimes, not least in the Middle East, more mortal than they, and many observers, are ready to admit.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1408-6980</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1581-1980</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1057/jird.2014.32</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London: Palgrave Macmillan UK</publisher><subject>Area Studies ; Authoritarianism ; Coercion ; Development Studies ; Frail ; Imagery ; International Relations ; Legitimacy ; Original Article ; Political Science and International Relations ; Political Science and International Studies ; Politics ; Rents ; Social contract ; Sovereignty ; Stability ; Sustainability ; Tax revenues ; Taxation</subject><ispartof>Journal of international relations and development, 2017, Vol.20 (1), p.55-79</ispartof><rights>Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2016</rights><rights>Copyright Palgrave Macmillan Jan 2017</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c301t-ba7d982304fe654803b03d4d858a1d213248e1aff08285a981cd7cb0e96046e53</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c301t-ba7d982304fe654803b03d4d858a1d213248e1aff08285a981cd7cb0e96046e53</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/1871310653/fulltextPDF?pq-origsite=primo$$EPDF$$P50$$Gproquest$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/1871310653?pq-origsite=primo$$EHTML$$P50$$Gproquest$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,12845,12847,21387,21394,27866,27924,27925,33223,33611,33985,43733,43948,74093,74340</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Abulof, Uriel</creatorcontrib><title>‘Can’t buy me legitimacy’: the elusive stability of Mideast rentier regimes</title><title>Journal of international relations and development</title><addtitle>J Int Relat Dev</addtitle><description>This paper qualitatively revisits the thesis that rentier regimes can draw on their non-tax revenues to buy political legitimacy and stability. Exploring the material/moral interplay in Mideast rentier politics, I show why and how rents may provide for provisional, but not sustainable, stability for authoritarian rentier regimes. I propose distinguishing between negative and positive political legitimacy, the former being about ‘what is legitimate’ (liberty
vs
security), and the latter about ‘who is the legitimator’ (divine/hereditary right
vs
popular sovereignty). Sustainable stability is predicated on having both legitimacies. Rentier regimes, however, often draw exclusively on negative political legitimacy. These regimes can use rents to buy time — through coercion and expediency — contriving an imagery of a lusty Leviathan. But due to the diversity of rents and the temporal shifts in their revenues, this social contract is materially contingent and morally frail — rendering authoritarian rentier regimes, not least in the Middle East, more mortal than they, and many observers, are ready to admit.</description><subject>Area Studies</subject><subject>Authoritarianism</subject><subject>Coercion</subject><subject>Development Studies</subject><subject>Frail</subject><subject>Imagery</subject><subject>International Relations</subject><subject>Legitimacy</subject><subject>Original Article</subject><subject>Political Science and International Relations</subject><subject>Political Science and International Studies</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Rents</subject><subject>Social contract</subject><subject>Sovereignty</subject><subject>Stability</subject><subject>Sustainability</subject><subject>Tax 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Exploring the material/moral interplay in Mideast rentier politics, I show why and how rents may provide for provisional, but not sustainable, stability for authoritarian rentier regimes. I propose distinguishing between negative and positive political legitimacy, the former being about ‘what is legitimate’ (liberty
vs
security), and the latter about ‘who is the legitimator’ (divine/hereditary right
vs
popular sovereignty). Sustainable stability is predicated on having both legitimacies. Rentier regimes, however, often draw exclusively on negative political legitimacy. These regimes can use rents to buy time — through coercion and expediency — contriving an imagery of a lusty Leviathan. But due to the diversity of rents and the temporal shifts in their revenues, this social contract is materially contingent and morally frail — rendering authoritarian rentier regimes, not least in the Middle East, more mortal than they, and many observers, are ready to admit.</abstract><cop>London</cop><pub>Palgrave Macmillan UK</pub><doi>10.1057/jird.2014.32</doi><tpages>25</tpages></addata></record> |
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source | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Politics Collection; Springer Nature; Social Science Premium Collection (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3); PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts |
subjects | Area Studies Authoritarianism Coercion Development Studies Frail Imagery International Relations Legitimacy Original Article Political Science and International Relations Political Science and International Studies Politics Rents Social contract Sovereignty Stability Sustainability Tax revenues Taxation |
title | ‘Can’t buy me legitimacy’: the elusive stability of Mideast rentier regimes |
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