Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi

Asymmetric information is a key feature of the marriage market. In HIV-endemic settings, HIV risk is an important partner attribute that may influence marriage timing and partner selection. We use a sample of married women in rural Malawi to validate a model of positive assortative matching under as...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review 2017-05, Vol.107 (5), p.154-157
Main Authors: Angelucci, Manuela, Bennett, Daniel
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetric information
Condoms
Courtship
Economic models
Elementary schools
Financial risk
HIV
HIV infections
Human immunodeficiency virus
Husbands
Information asymmetry
Marriage
MARRIAGE MARKET: FORMATION, SELECTION, AND POLICY EFFECTS
Marriage timing
Physical attractiveness
Political economy
Risk
Rural communities
Spouses
Wives
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Summary:Asymmetric information is a key feature of the marriage market. In HIV-endemic settings, HIV risk is an important partner attribute that may influence marriage timing and partner selection. We use a sample of married women in rural Malawi to validate a model of positive assortative matching under asymmetric information. Several correlations support this framework, suggesting that HIV risk contributes to adverse selection in the marriage market in this setting.
ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.p20171055