Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments

We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on observable substitutability, we...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review 2017-05, Vol.107 (5), p.214-219
Main Authors: Hatfield, John William, Kominers, Scott Duke, Westkamp, Alexander
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Contracts
Economic models
Economic theory
Geometric centers
Health outcomes
Hiring
Mapping
Matching
MATCHING WITHOUT SUBSTITUTES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
Mathematical functions
Mathematical monotonicity
Observed choices
Scholarship funds
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Summary:We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on observable substitutability, we show that multi-division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy-proof matching; these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible.
ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.p20171050