PARTY POLARIZATION IN LEGISLATURES WITH OFFICE-MOTIVATED CANDIDATES

We develop a theory of legislative competition in which voters care about local candidate valence and national party positions that are determined by the parties’ median legislators. As long as election outcomes are sufficiently predictable, the only stable equilibria exhibit policy divergence betwe...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Quarterly journal of economics 2017-08, Vol.132 (3), p.1509-1550
Main Authors: Polborn, Mattias K., Snyder, James M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Candidates
Ideology
Legislators
Legislatures
Nationalist movements
Polarization
State elections
State legislatures
Studies
Uncertainty
Voters
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Summary:We develop a theory of legislative competition in which voters care about local candidate valence and national party positions that are determined by the parties’ median legislators. As long as election outcomes are sufficiently predictable, the only stable equilibria exhibit policy divergence between the parties. If the degree of uncertainty about election outcomes decreases, and if voters place less weight on local candidates’ valence, polarization between the parties increases. Furthermore, a systematic electoral shock makes the party favored by the shock more moderate, while the disadvantaged party becomes more extreme. Finally, we examine data on state elections and the ideological positions of state legislatures and find patterns that are consistent with key predictions of our model.
ISSN:0033-5533
1531-4650
DOI:10.1093/qje/qjx012