Rent-seeking and the behavior of regulators: An empirical analysis: 1. Introduction

The theory of rent-seeking introduced by Tullock (1967) is typically linked to government action and is now part of the conventional wisdom when analyzing the political behavior of self-interested agents. Forced wealth transfers are unlikely without the exercise of government powers in that rent-see...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 1991-02, Vol.69 (1), p.51
Main Author: Boucher, Michel
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Decision making
Economic impact
Equilibrium
Political behavior
Politics
Regulated industries
Regulation
Regulatory agencies
Shadow prices
Trucking industry
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Summary:The theory of rent-seeking introduced by Tullock (1967) is typically linked to government action and is now part of the conventional wisdom when analyzing the political behavior of self-interested agents. Forced wealth transfers are unlikely without the exercise of government powers in that rent-seeker is characteristically trying to get something which will ultimately reduce the net wealth of other people. This specific action may only take place in a nonproprietary setting or in a situation where property rights are attenuated which is generally the domain of the public activities.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101