Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games

This paper considers populations of agents whose behavior when playing some underlying game is governed by perturbed best (or better) response dynamics with perturbation probabilities that depend log-linearly on payoffs, a class that includes the logit choice rule. A convention is a state at which e...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2017-10, Vol.64 (3), p.589-604
Main Authors: Hwang, Sung-Ha, Newton, Jonathan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Coordination
Economic aspects
Economic conditions
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Forecasts and trends
Game Theory
Games
Microeconomics
Payoffs
Public Finance
Research Article
Social and Behav. Sciences
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This paper considers populations of agents whose behavior when playing some underlying game is governed by perturbed best (or better) response dynamics with perturbation probabilities that depend log-linearly on payoffs, a class that includes the logit choice rule. A convention is a state at which every agent plays a strategy that corresponds to the same strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. For coordination games with zero payoff off-diagonal, it is shown that the difficulty of leaving the basin of attraction of a convention can be well approximated by only considering paths of transitions on which an identical perturbation repeatedly affects one of the populations.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-016-0988-x