Hypothetico-Deductivism: Incomplete but Not Hopeless

Alleged counter-examples deployed in Park (2004) ["Erkenntnis" 60: 229-240] against the account of selective hypothetico-deductive confirmation offered in Gemes (1998) ["Erkenntnis" 49: 1-20] are shown to be ineffective. Furthermore, the reservations expressed in Gemes (1998) [ib...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Erkenntnis 2005-07, Vol.63 (1), p.139-147
Main Author: Gemes, Ken
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Axiomatization
Breasts
Dogs
General philosophy. Metaphysics
Hope
Hypothetico deductive model
Inference
Intuition
Mammals
Model theory
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
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Summary:Alleged counter-examples deployed in Park (2004) ["Erkenntnis" 60: 229-240] against the account of selective hypothetico-deductive confirmation offered in Gemes (1998) ["Erkenntnis" 49: 1-20] are shown to be ineffective. Furthermore, the reservations expressed in Gemes (1998) [ibid] and (1993) ["Philosophy of Science" 62: 477-487] about hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) are retracted and replaced with the conclusion that H-D is a viable account of confirmation that captures much of the practice of working scientists. However, because it cannot capture cases of inference to the best explanation and cases of the observational confirmation of statistical hypotheses, it is concluded that H-D cannot supply a complete theory of confirmation.
ISSN:0165-0106
1572-8420
DOI:10.1007/s10670-004-6882-0