Non-Prioritized Ranked Belief Change

Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of philosophical logic 2003-08, Vol.32 (4), p.417-443
Main Authors: Chopra, Samir, Ghose, Aditya, Meyer, Thomas
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Artificial intelligence
Belief
Beliefs
Computer science
Economic models
Entailment
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Inference
Intuition
Investigations
Knowledge bases
Logic
Logic programming
Model theory
Multisets
Philosophy
Rationality
Reasoning
Reduction (Phonological or Phonetic)
Religion
Semantics
Theory
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Summary:Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in the process of belief revision. This approach is, however, restrictive in assuming a linear ordering of reliability on the received inputs. In this paper, we replace the linear ordering with a preference ranking on inputs from which a total preorder on inputs can be induced. This extension brings along with it the problem of dealing with inputs of equal rank. We provide a semantic solution to this problem which contains, as a special case, AGM belief change on closed theories.
ISSN:0022-3611
1573-0433
DOI:10.1023/A:1024888511283