Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay

We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depres...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association 2017-12, Vol.20 (4), p.809-835
Main Authors: Hernandez-Lagos, Pablo, Minor, Dylan, Sisak, Dana
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Communication
Cooperation
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Group performance
Incentives
Leadership
Microeconomics
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Organizational performance
Original Paper
Preferences
Self interest
Social and Behav. Sciences
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Summary:We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.
ISSN:1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI:10.1007/s10683-017-9512-9