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A Differential Game Related to Terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg Strategies
The question of how best to prosecute the ‘war on terror’ leads to strategic interaction in an intertemporal setting. We consider a nonzero sum differential game between a government and a terrorist organisation. Due to the state-separability of the game we are able to determine Nash and Stackelberg...
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Published in: | Journal of optimization theory and applications 2010-03, Vol.144 (3), p.533-555 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | The question of how best to prosecute the ‘war on terror’ leads to strategic interaction in an intertemporal setting. We consider a nonzero sum differential game between a government and a terrorist organisation. Due to the state-separability of the game we are able to determine Nash and Stackelberg solutions in analytic form. Their comparison as well as the sensitivity analysis deliver interesting insight into the design of efficient measures to combat terror. |
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ISSN: | 0022-3239 1573-2878 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10957-009-9643-z |