On Rights in Game Forms

This paper makes a contribution to the further development of the game-theoretic analysis of rights. The model presented here differs in several respects from the existing models. First of all, a distinction is made between outcome-oriented and action-oriented rights, a distinction which is closely...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2000-06, Vol.123 (3), p.295-326
Main Authors: Fleurbaey, Marc, Van Hees, Martin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cigarette smoking
Civil rights
Contracts
Decision making
Game theory
Games
Legal systems
Natural rights
Philosophy
Philosophy of history. Social and political philosophy. Philosophy of law
Philosophy of law
Scapegoats
Social choice
State of nature
Voting rights
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Summary:This paper makes a contribution to the further development of the game-theoretic analysis of rights. The model presented here differs in several respects from the existing models. First of all, a distinction is made between outcome-oriented and action-oriented rights, a distinction which is closely related to the distinction between active and passive rights. Second, the legal-theoretic notions of negative and positive rights are formally defined. Third, we not only discuss the definition of rights, but also the way rights can be violated. Using the distinction between negative and positive rights on the one hand, and between active and passive rights on the other, four different types of basic rights are distinguished. For each of these rights, the situations in which they can be said to be respected are examined. We thereby distinguish two possible sources of obstruction: by (groups of) individuals, and by law. Finally, the question of the possible realization of rights is examined. Depending on how the problem of the possible mutual incompatibility of rights is addressed, two distinct approaches are examined. It turns out that in both approaches the possible realization of rights crucially depends on characteristics of the 'state of nature'.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1023/A:1005232419918