Safety and Epistemic Luck

There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S's belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulatio...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2007-10, Vol.158 (3), p.303-313
Main Authors: Hiller, Avram, Neta, Ram
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Barns
Contextualism
Counterexamples
Epistemic luck
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Inference
Intuition
Justified beliefs
Knowledge
Modal realism
Philosophy
Thermometers
Truth
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Summary:There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S's belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-006-9041-0