Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the like

The political control exercised through cost-benefit analysis and similar strategy-laden instruments allows one or more policymakers to force a competing policymaker to expend valuable, and limited resources. Indeed, the imposition of these instruments by a controlling political coalition can compro...

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Published in:University of Pennsylvania law review 2002-05, Vol.150 (5), p.1453-1472
Main Author: Tiller, Emerson H.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Administrative agencies
Analysis
Benefit cost analysis
Commentaries
Cost benefit analysis
Cost control
Court costs
Economic policy
Judges
Judicial system
Law and economics
Legislators
Policy making
Politics
Powers and duties
Regulatory legislation
Statutory interpretation
Statutory law
Tillers
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description The political control exercised through cost-benefit analysis and similar strategy-laden instruments allows one or more policymakers to force a competing policymaker to expend valuable, and limited resources. Indeed, the imposition of these instruments by a controlling political coalition can compromise greatly, or even prevent, policies desired by a competing policymaking institution.
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1942-8537
language eng
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source Nexis UK; Business Source Ultimate; JSTOR Archival Journals
subjects Administrative agencies
Analysis
Benefit cost analysis
Commentaries
Cost benefit analysis
Cost control
Court costs
Economic policy
Judges
Judicial system
Law and economics
Legislators
Policy making
Politics
Powers and duties
Regulatory legislation
Statutory interpretation
Statutory law
Tillers
title Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the like
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