PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiv...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Econometrica 2017-11, Vol.85 (6), p.1949-1964
Main Authors: Kolotilin, Anton, Mylovanov, Tymofiy, Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, Li, Ming
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bayesian persuasion
Disclosure
experiments
information design
information disclosure
Information management
mechanism design without transfers
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Persuasion
persuasion mechanisms
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Summary:We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
ISSN:0012-9682
1468-0262
DOI:10.3982/ECTA13251