PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiv...

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Published in:Econometrica 2017-11, Vol.85 (6), p.1949-1964
Main Authors: Kolotilin, Anton, Mylovanov, Tymofiy, Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, Li, Ming
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bayesian persuasion
Disclosure
experiments
information design
information disclosure
Information management
mechanism design without transfers
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Persuasion
persuasion mechanisms
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container_end_page 1964
container_issue 6
container_start_page 1949
container_title Econometrica
container_volume 85
creator Kolotilin, Anton
Mylovanov, Tymofiy
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Li, Ming
description We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
doi_str_mv 10.3982/ECTA13251
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Wiley; EBSCOhost Econlit with Full Text; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection
subjects Bayesian persuasion
Disclosure
experiments
information design
information disclosure
Information management
mechanism design without transfers
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Persuasion
persuasion mechanisms
title PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER
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