Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801

• Published in: The Yale law journal 2006-04, Vol.115 (6), p.1256-1344
• Main Author: Mashaw, Jerry L.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: 1783-1865; 19th century; Administrative courts; Administrative law; Bureaucracy; Common law; Congressional investigations; Executive branch; Federal government; Federal law; Federal legislation; Federalism; Government; Historical analysis; History; Interstate commerce; Judicial review; Judicial reviews; Litigation; Political power; Post offices; Public administration; Statutory law; United States history
• ISSN: 0044-0094; 1939-8611
• DOI: 10.2307/20455655

By scholarly convention, federal administrative law begins in the United States in 1887 with the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Before that time the national government is perceived as a state of courts and parties in which federal administration was minimal and congressional statutes were either self-executing or so detailed as to preclude significant administrative discretion. Such administration as there was went on within executive departments under the exclusive control of the President, and judicial review of administrative action was virtually unknown. From this perspective the administrative state of the twenty-first century, with its independent commissions, combinations of legislative, executive, and judicial authority in administrative agencies, broad delegations of administrative discretion, limitations on presidential control of administration, and ubiquitous opportunities for judicial review of executive action, represents a radical transformation of original constitutional understandings. There is much truth in this conventional vision of nineteenth-century governance, but far from the whole truth. This Article begins a project of recovering the lost one hundred years of federal administrative law. For statutory sources, agency practice, and common law actions in the Federalist period reveal a quite different and more nuanced picture. From the very beginning some administrators were clothed with broad statutory authority, made general rules, adjudicated cases, were located outside of departments, and were tightly bound to congressional oversight and direction. And common law actions provided a judicial review that was often more intrusive and robust than we observe in contemporary practice. If there was an original understanding of the structure, function, and control of administration in early federal law, Federalist practices suggest that it was a much more complex and pragmatic understanding than our conventional account admits.