Is It a Prosecutor's World?: Determinants of Count Bargaining Decisions

Prosecutors have virtually unfettered discretion in their plea negotiations with defendants. Where discretion is unrestricted, unwarranted disparity is likely to follow. The current study examines the relationship between offender characteristics and count bargaining. From an integrated theory appro...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of contemporary criminal justice 2006-08, Vol.22 (3), p.241-260
Main Author: Ball, Jeremy D.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Criminal pleas
Defendants
Employment status
Ethnicity
Overcharging
Public prosecutors
Race
Regression analysis
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Summary:Prosecutors have virtually unfettered discretion in their plea negotiations with defendants. Where discretion is unrestricted, unwarranted disparity is likely to follow. The current study examines the relationship between offender characteristics and count bargaining. From an integrated theory approach (integrating concession and consensus models, liberation hypothesis, and focal concerns theory), the current study hypothesizes that race and ethnicity, sex, age, and employment status of the offender has an effect on count bargaining decisions in only the borderline serious cases. Data were collected on 2,578 guilty pleas in Chicago, Illinois, in 1993 and analyzed using a backwards selection logistic regression analysis partitioning cases by severity of the most serious charge. The results from these analyses indicate that offender characteristics do not have a statistically significant effect on count bargaining. However, there may be important differences masked by straight pleas, symbolic bargaining, and overcharging practices.
ISSN:1043-9862
1552-5406
DOI:10.1177/1043986206292369