Gergen's Social Constructionism, Logical Positivism and the Continuity of Error

This paper provides further evidence for the thesis that K.J. Gergen's social constructionism and logical positivism are not antithetical. Gergen's metatheory, the later version of Schlick's verificationism and the operationism of Bridgman and S.S. Stevens, each in their own way, inco...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Theory & psychology 2001-06, Vol.11 (3), p.323-346
Main Author: Hibberd, Fiona J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Constructionism
Ecumenism
Epistemology
Meaning
Positivism
Psychology
Social constructionism
Social psychology
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951)
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Summary:This paper provides further evidence for the thesis that K.J. Gergen's social constructionism and logical positivism are not antithetical. Gergen's metatheory, the later version of Schlick's verificationism and the operationism of Bridgman and S.S. Stevens, each in their own way, incorporate forms of the meaning-as-use thesis. Schlick and Gergen, in particular, are heirs of Wittgenstein's legacy. Yet the identification of meaning with use involves an incomplete characterization of meaning. It is inconsistent with the fact that the intension of any genuine term is always a set of general characteristics. Not surprisingly, the semantic similarities between logical positivism and social constructionism are driven by a common epistemology. Despite surface differences, both retain Kant's belief that the constituents of reality are not directly knowable. To the extent that positivism, operationism and social constructionism have influenced psychology, psychology has been aligned with anti-realist meta-theory and has not progressed. Yet these three `schools' admit implicitly the realist views that they deny explicitly. This demonstrates the un-avoidability of certain realist assumptions.
ISSN:0959-3543
1461-7447
DOI:10.1177/0959354301113003