Might-beliefs and asymmetric disagreement

What we can call asymmetric disagreement occurs when one agent is in disagreement with another, but not vice-versa. In this paper, I give an example of and develop a framework for understanding this phenomenon. One pivotal feature of my example is that one of the agents in the scenario has a belief...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2019-11, Vol.196 (11), p.4775-4805
Main Author: Lennertz, Benjamin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetry
Belief & doubt
Beliefs
Education
Epistemology
Logic
Metaphysics
Phenomenology
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
REGULAR ARTICLES
Semantics
Validity
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Summary:What we can call asymmetric disagreement occurs when one agent is in disagreement with another, but not vice-versa. In this paper, I give an example of and develop a framework for understanding this phenomenon. One pivotal feature of my example is that one of the agents in the scenario has a belief about what might be the case—a might-belief. I show that a traditional account of might-beliefs and disagreement cannot explain the initially surprising phenomenon of asymmetric disagreement. In order to provide an explanation, I develop a dynamic account of might-beliefs and a corresponding account of disagreement. I close by exploring a choice point for our account—showing that the simple dynamic account has some controversial (though, perhaps, true) consequences. I explore how revisionary notions of validity, inconsistency, and disagreement can allow us to avoid these consequences if we wish.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-018-1688-9