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The role of professional designations as quality signals
Using the framework of agency and information theory, Rudolph (1994) argued that the existence of bad appraisals would not necessarily drive out good ones. As long as a market exists for high-quality appraisals, some producers will continue to meet their demand. The issue is reexamined from the pers...
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| Published in: | The Appraisal journal 1999-04, Vol.67 (2), p.143 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 143 |
| container_title | The Appraisal journal |
| container_volume | 67 |
| creator | Finch, J. Howard Fogelberg, Larry Weeks, H. Shelton |
| description | Using the framework of agency and information theory, Rudolph (1994) argued that the existence of bad appraisals would not necessarily drive out good ones. As long as a market exists for high-quality appraisals, some producers will continue to meet their demand. The issue is reexamined from the perspective of economic game theory. Appraisers planning to produce high-quality appraisal reports over the long term may use professional designations to signal their intentions to the market. By enhancing client ability to differentiate appraisal quality, these designations increase the market for high-quality appraisal reports. |
| format | article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0003-7087 |
| ispartof | The Appraisal journal, 1999-04, Vol.67 (2), p.143 |
| issn | 0003-7087 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_199952133 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest) |
| subjects | Appraisals Appraisers Commercial real estate Continuing education Costs Game theory Production increases Quality management Real estate appraisal Real estate appraisers Reputations Studies Valuation |
| title | The role of professional designations as quality signals |
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