Relational capital in lending relationships: evidence from European family firms

The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of family CEOs’ relational capital and non-family CEOs’ managerial skills in the context of bank relationships for a large sample of small- and mediumsized European firms. The results indicate that family firms appointing family managers are significa...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Small business economics 2019-01, Vol.52 (1), p.277-301
Main Authors: Cucculelli, Marco, Zazzaro, Alberto, Peruzzi, Valentina
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bank loans
Business and Management
Chief executive officers
Chief executives
Companies
Entrepreneurship
Family owned businesses
Industrial Organization
Management
Microeconomics
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Summary:The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of family CEOs’ relational capital and non-family CEOs’ managerial skills in the context of bank relationships for a large sample of small- and mediumsized European firms. The results indicate that family firms appointing family managers are significantly more likely to maintain soft-information-based and longer-lasting lending relationships than family firms managed by professionals, and that these closer bank-firm ties reduce the likelihood of experiencing credit restrictions. Moreover, we find that having professional CEOs does not directly affect the probability of being credit rationed. Hence, family relational capital appears to have a univocal beneficial impact on bank-firm relationships.
ISSN:0921-898X
1573-0913
DOI:10.1007/s11187-018-0019-3