Equal treatment without large numbers

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which core allocations of arbitrary TU-games treat substitute players equally. The core satisfies the equal treatment property if and only if no player needs the participation of all of her substitutes to attain her core payoffs. We show how, wit...

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Published in:International journal of game theory 2018-11, Vol.47 (4), p.1239-1259
Main Authors: Bejan, Camelia, Gómez, Juan Camilo
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Allocations
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Consumption
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Game Theory
Games
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Payoffs
Property
Social and Behav. Sciences
Substitutes
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Gómez, Juan Camilo
description We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which core allocations of arbitrary TU-games treat substitute players equally. The core satisfies the equal treatment property if and only if no player needs the participation of all of her substitutes to attain her core payoffs. We show how, without the requirement of a large number of players, this condition generalizes and unifies other sufficient conditions proposed in the literature (in the context of large games and economies) and it helps derive new results for particular classes of games.
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source EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】; ABI/INFORM Global; Springer Nature
subjects Allocations
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Consumption
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Game Theory
Games
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Payoffs
Property
Social and Behav. Sciences
Substitutes
title Equal treatment without large numbers
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