Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide

It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully imple...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Mathematical social sciences 2018-01, Vol.91, p.56-61
Main Authors: Caffera, Marcelo, Dubra, Juan, Figueroa, Nicolás
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Fines
Game theory
Inspections
Preferences
Social choice
Studies
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Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).
ISSN:0165-4896
1879-3118
DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.002