Self-ascription and the de se

This paper defends Lewis’ (Philos Rev 88:513–543, 1979a ) influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism to the effect that a key explanatory notion— self-ascription —goes unexplained (Cappelen and Dever in The inessential indexical, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013 ; Holton, in...

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Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2020-05, Vol.197 (5), p.2039-2050
Main Author: Openshaw, James
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Attitudes
Deixis
Education
Epistemology
Lewis, David K (1941- )
Logic
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Self awareness
Self image
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description This paper defends Lewis’ (Philos Rev 88:513–543, 1979a ) influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism to the effect that a key explanatory notion— self-ascription —goes unexplained (Cappelen and Dever in The inessential indexical, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013 ; Holton, in: Loewer, Schaffer (eds) The Blackwell companion to David Lewis, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 399–410, 2015 ). It is shown that Lewis’ treatment can be reconstructed in a way which provides clear responses. This sheds light on the explanatory ambitions of those engaged in Lewis’ project.
doi_str_mv 10.1007/s11229-018-1781-0
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subjects Attitudes
Deixis
Education
Epistemology
Lewis, David K (1941- )
Logic
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Self awareness
Self image
title Self-ascription and the de se
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