Education, social mobility, and the mismatch of talents

This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generation model featuring social mobility inhibited by the mismatch of talents. Mobility decreases as the private education gap between the two classes widens, whereas it increases with increased public education spending. Within this framework, the stud...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2018-05, Vol.65 (3), p.575-607
Main Author: Uchida, Yuki
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Economic aspects
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Education
Expenditures
Forecasts and trends
Game Theory
Intergenerational mobility
Microeconomics
Political power
Public expenditures
Public Finance
Public schools
Research Article
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social mobility
Upward mobility
Voting
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Summary:This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generation model featuring social mobility inhibited by the mismatch of talents. Mobility decreases as the private education gap between the two classes widens, whereas it increases with increased public education spending. Within this framework, the study considers voting on public education and shows that when the political power of the rich is strong, the government implements low redistributive expenditures, which in turn induces a cyclical motion of social mobility across generations.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-016-1027-7