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The role of entrepreneurial organizations in organizing collective action against administrative corruption: evidence from Russia

This study is aimed at analyzing the effectiveness of the anti-corruption activities of Russian entrepreneurial organizations and their ability to mobilize individual entrepreneurs and organize their collective action against corrupt public officials and regulatory agencies. In particular, the study...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 2018-01, Vol.26 (1), p.87-103
Main Author: Krylova, Yulia
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:This study is aimed at analyzing the effectiveness of the anti-corruption activities of Russian entrepreneurial organizations and their ability to mobilize individual entrepreneurs and organize their collective action against corrupt public officials and regulatory agencies. In particular, the study focuses on administrative corruption in the form of bribe extortion for routine governmental actions, such as issuing permits, licences and work orders. The paper uses a survey and in-depth interviews with entrepreneurs in three Russian regions characterized by different levels of entrepreneurial activities: Moscow, Saint Petersburg and the republic of Karelia. The results of the study demonstrate that only a small fraction of entrepreneurs file complaints to entrepreneurial organizations in situations of bribe extortion. The paper analyzes political, social and organizational factors that decrease the effectiveness of anti-corruption activities of Russian entrepreneurial organizations. Due to a low level of cohesion, the Russian business community is unable to counteract corruption, while local protests by entrepreneurs against administrative injustice fail to mobilize massive numbers of participants.
ISSN:2573-9638
2573-9646
DOI:10.1080/25739638.2018.1419907