‘The Court, it is I’? Individual judicial powers in the Brazilian Supreme Court and their implications for constitutional theory

• Published in: Global constitutionalism 2018-07, Vol.7 (2), p.236-262
• Main Authors: WERNECK ARGUELHES, DIEGO, MOLHANO RIBEIRO, LEANDRO
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Criminal investigations; Federal court decisions; Injunctions; Judges & magistrates; Judicial powers; Judicial reviews; Law schools; Parliamentary procedure; Politics; Public prosecutors; State laws; Term limitations
• ISSN: 2045-3817; 2045-3825
• DOI: 10.1017/S2045381718000072

Collective decision-making is often taken as an ‘institutional fact’ when it comes to supreme and constitutional courts. In this article, we focus on the example of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, or STF) to argue that this feature should not be assumed from the outset, as it does not necessarily hold, across countries, for all relevant powers that courts may have. As this example illustrates, the assignment to individual Justices of three distinct powers, namely agenda setting, position taking, and decision making, can have profound effects on the legislative status quo outside the court, amounting in some circumstances to a form of individual judicial review. This expanded typology of court powers both points to an underexplored spectrum for comparing different courts and makes it necessary to discuss if and how particular distributions of such powers within multi-member courts are normatively justified. In the specific case of the STF, we argue that the specific combination of individual allocations of agenda setting and decision-making powers, which gives rise in practice to the possibility of individual judicial review, cannot be reconciled with basic tenets of constitutional theory.