A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations

• Published in: Mathematical social sciences 2018-03, Vol.92, p.22-34
• Main Authors: Friehe, Tim, Tabbach, Avraham
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Action; Behavior; Crime; Equilibrium; Games; Social dilemmas; Social policy; Volunteers
• ISSN: 0165-4896; 1879-3118
• DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.09.002

This paper explores a class of social dilemmas in which the participation of a given number of individuals is required to achieve a social end in the absence of a coordinating authority (e.g., rescuing a person in peril or preventing an imminent crime). After describing the first- and second-best outcomes, we examine whether simple policy instruments such as punishments and rewards can induce the second-best outcome, distinguishing between policies based on an individual’s actions (i.e., action-based policies) and policies based on the outcome (i.e., outcome-based policies). For the domain of simple policies considered, we establish that action-based policies enjoy a crucial advantage over outcome-based ones: namely, outcome-based policies always feature an equilibrium with no participation, whereas action-based policies exclude this equilibrium. •We analyze a generalized volunteer’s dilemma situation.•Comparing the efficiency of outcome and action-based social policies to mitigate it.•Action-based policies enjoy a crucial advantage over outcome-based ones.•Outcome-based policies always feature an equilibrium with no participation.•Action-based policies exclude an equilibrium with no participation (a social trap).•Findings consistent with two common features of the law in emergency like situations.