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Auditor Reputation Building

This paper reports the results of an experimental economics study designed to examine reputation building by information verifiers (auditors). The results identify boundary conditions to reputation formation and supply insight into auditors' incentives to form reputations. Reputations form in a...

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Published in:	Journal of accounting research 2001-12, Vol.39 (3), p.599-617
Main Author:	Mayhew, Brian W.
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Audit quality Auditors Auditors opinions Audits Boundary conditions Equilibrium Experiments Financial investments Financial management Incentives Investment strategies Investors Management audits Market equilibrium Nash equilibrium Public image management Reputation Reputations Robots Studies
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cited_by	cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4470-2972be584da3c2dccc1bdf988662157ee18c51853c8782dd15ffced5fe4873783
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container_end_page	617
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container_title	Journal of accounting research
container_volume	39
creator	Mayhew, Brian W.
description	This paper reports the results of an experimental economics study designed to examine reputation building by information verifiers (auditors). The results identify boundary conditions to reputation formation and supply insight into auditors' incentives to form reputations. Reputations form in all sessions of treatments that supply nearly immediate rewards to participants who adopt reputation equilibrium strategies. In contrast, reputations form in less than half of the sessions of a treatment where participants have to maintain reputation equilibrium strategies for number of periods before the market rewards their effort. The results suggest the immediacy of rewards for adopting reputation strategies is a critical determinant of reputation formation.
doi_str_mv	10.1111/1475-679X.00030
format	article
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source	International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Wiley:Jisc Collections:Wiley Read and Publish Open Access 2024-2025 (reading list); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Business Source Ultimate (EBSCOHost)
subjects	Audit quality Auditors Auditors opinions Audits Boundary conditions Equilibrium Experiments Financial investments Financial management Incentives Investment strategies Investors Management audits Market equilibrium Nash equilibrium Public image management Reputation Reputations Robots Studies
title	Auditor Reputation Building
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