Strategic Equilibria in Queues with Dynamic Service Rate and Full Information

We consider the problem of customer equilibrium behavior of a single server Markovian queue with dynamic control of the service rate. Customers arrive according a Poisson procedure and the system administrator makes a service rate choice between a low and a high value according to a \(T\)-threshold...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:arXiv.org 2018-05
Main Authors: Burnetas, Apostolos, Dimitrakopoulos, Yiannis
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Customer services
Customers
Dynamic control
Markov analysis
Markov processes
Queues
Queuing theory
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:We consider the problem of customer equilibrium behavior of a single server Markovian queue with dynamic control of the service rate. Customers arrive according a Poisson procedure and the system administrator makes a service rate choice between a low and a high value according to a \(T\)-threshold dynamic service policy, where the decision for switching to the higher service rate is made when the number of customers exceeds T without any additional cost. We assume that customers are identical and they are making join decisions regarding the maximization of their expected net benefit, receiving a fixed reward for service completion and incurring a waiting cost. In addition, we consider the observable case of the model where customers are fully informed on the service policy and the queue length upon arrival.
ISSN:2331-8422