Do Proxies for Informed Trading Measure Informed Trading? Evidence from Illegal Insider Trades

Working Paper No. 24297 This paper exploits hand-collected data on illegal insider trades to test whether standard illiquidity measures can detect informed trading. Controlling for unobserved cross-sectional and time-series variation, sampling bias, and strategic timing of insider trades, I find tha...

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Published in:NBER Working Paper Series 2018-02, p.24297
Main Author: Ahern, Kenneth R
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetry
Economic theory
Regulation of financial institutions
Securities markets
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description Working Paper No. 24297 This paper exploits hand-collected data on illegal insider trades to test whether standard illiquidity measures can detect informed trading. Controlling for unobserved cross-sectional and time-series variation, sampling bias, and strategic timing of insider trades, I find that only absolute order imbalance and the negative autocorrelation of order flows are statistically and economically robust predictors of insider trading. However, this result only holds for short-lived information. When information is long-lived, none of the measures of illiquidity I consider detect informed trading, including bid-ask spreads, Kyle's lambda, and Amihud illiquidity. These results suggest that standard measures of illiquidity have limited applications.
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subjects Asymmetry
Economic theory
Regulation of financial institutions
Securities markets
title Do Proxies for Informed Trading Measure Informed Trading? Evidence from Illegal Insider Trades
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