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A Rational Approach to Cryptographic Protocols
This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from a rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows us to represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours of parties. Concretely, several concepts of two-person games and of two-party crypto...
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Published in: | arXiv.org 2010-05 |
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creator | Caballero-Gil, P Hernández-Goya, C Bruno-Castañeda, C |
description | This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from a rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows us to represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours of parties. Concretely, several concepts of two-person games and of two-party cryptographic protocols are here combined in order to model the latters as the formers. One of the main advantages of analysing a cryptographic protocol in the game-theory setting is the possibility of describing improved and stronger cryptographic solutions because possible adversarial behaviours may be taken into account directly. With those tools, protocols can be studied in a malicious model in order to find equilibrium conditions that make possible to protect honest parties against all possible strategies of adversaries. |
doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.1005.0082 |
format | article |
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subjects | Cryptography Equilibrium conditions Game theory Public Key Infrastructure |
title | A Rational Approach to Cryptographic Protocols |
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