An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies

We consider strategic market games associated to exchange economies both in a framework with no uncertainty and with asymmetric information. We address the asymptotic convergence of active Nash equilibria of strategic market games to Walrasian ones for general sequences of economies whose distributi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2018-08, Vol.66 (2), p.301-325
Main Authors: Koutsougeras, Leonidas C., Meo, Claudia
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Asymmetric information
Asymptotic distribution (Probability theory)
Convergence
Economic models
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Games
Microeconomics
Public Finance
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Sequences
Social and Behav. Sciences
Strategic alliances (Business)
Uncertainty
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Description
Summary:We consider strategic market games associated to exchange economies both in a framework with no uncertainty and with asymmetric information. We address the asymptotic convergence of active Nash equilibria of strategic market games to Walrasian ones for general sequences of economies whose distribution of characteristics has compact support.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-017-1068-6