Non-collaborative Attackers and How and Where to Defend Flawed Security Protocols (Extended Version)

Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and allows honest agents to continue to use it until a correcte...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:arXiv.org 2014-05
Main Authors: Peroli, Michele, Viganò, Luca, Zavatteri, Matteo
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Collaboration
Knowledge management
Network topologies
Protocol
Protocol (computers)
Security
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and allows honest agents to continue to use it until a corrected version is released. Our approach is based on the knowledge of the network topology, which we model as a graph, and on the consequent possibility of creating an interference to an ongoing attack of a Dolev-Yao attacker, by means of non-collaboration actuated by ad-hoc benign attackers that play the role of network guardians. Such guardians, positioned in strategical points of the network, have the task of monitoring the messages in transit and discovering at runtime, through particular types of inference, whether an attack is ongoing, interrupting the run of the protocol in the positive case. We study not only how but also where we can attempt to defend flawed security protocols: we investigate the different network topologies that make security protocol defense feasible and illustrate our approach by means of concrete examples.
ISSN:2331-8422