EVIDENCE, COHERENCE AND EPISTEMIC AKRASIA

Rationality is generally thought to constrain our beliefs in at least two ways. First, rationality constrains the structure of our beliefs – it prohibits various forms of incoherence among our beliefs, at least at a time, and perhaps over time as well. Second, rationality constraints the substance o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Episteme 2018-09, Vol.15 (3), p.313-328
Main Author: Neta, Ram
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Beliefs
Confidence
Principles
Rationality
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Summary:Rationality is generally thought to constrain our beliefs in at least two ways. First, rationality constrains the structure of our beliefs – it prohibits various forms of incoherence among our beliefs, at least at a time, and perhaps over time as well. Second, rationality constraints the substance of our beliefs – it requires them to be appropriate to the evidence that we possess. Several philosophers have argued that the demands of coherence sometimes come into conflict with the demands of evidence: in such cases, an agent who believes in accordance with her evidence will end up displaying epistemic akrasia. In this paper, I show that the arguments that have so far been given for this conclusion are unsuccessful. We have no good reason to think that coherence and evidence can ever be in conflict.
ISSN:1742-3600
1750-0117
DOI:10.1017/epi.2018.25