Editorial

[...]this is almost a special issue. [...]yet importantly, Max Hocutt discusses the argument from responsibility for believing in free will. According to this argument, such believing is the strongest, if not the only, justification to hold people accountable for their acts.

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Published in:Behavior and philosophy 2017-01, Vol.45, p.I-III
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavioral psychology
Clinical psychology
Epistemology
Free will
Hypotheses
Hypothesis testing
Ontology
Realism
Science
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container_title Behavior and philosophy
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description [...]this is almost a special issue. [...]yet importantly, Max Hocutt discusses the argument from responsibility for believing in free will. According to this argument, such believing is the strongest, if not the only, justification to hold people accountable for their acts.
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source Art, Design and Architecture Collection; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection
subjects Behavioral psychology
Clinical psychology
Epistemology
Free will
Hypotheses
Hypothesis testing
Ontology
Realism
Science
title Editorial
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