Social dilemmas in an online social network: the structure and evolution of cooperation

We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation--Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network obtained from a social networking site. We demonstrate that such social network has small-world property and degree distribution has a power-law tail. Be...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:arXiv.org 2007-01
Main Authors: Fu, Feng, Chen, Xiaojie, Liu, Lianghuan, Wang, Long
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Computer & video games
Cooperation
Evolution
Game theory
Human behavior
Social networks
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation--Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network obtained from a social networking site. We demonstrate that such social network has small-world property and degree distribution has a power-law tail. Besides, it has hierarchical organizations and exhibits disassortative mixing pattern. We study the evolutionary version of the two types of games on it. It is found that enhancement and sustainment of cooperative behaviors are attributable to the underlying network topological organization. It is also shown that cooperators can survive when confronted with the invasion of defectors throughout the entire ranges of parameters of both games. The evolution of cooperation on empirical networks is influenced by various network effects in a combined manner, compared with that on model networks. Our results can help understand the cooperative behaviors in human groups and society.
ISSN:2331-8422
DOI:10.48550/arxiv.0701323